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Because the criteria for success differ across various domains of life, no single normative
standard will ever work for all types of thinking. One method for dealing with this apparent
dilemma is to propose that the mind is made up of a large number of specialized modules.
This review describes how this multi-modular framework for the mind overcomes several
critical conceptual and theoretical challenges to our understanding of human thinking, and
hopefully clariﬁes what are (and are not) some of the implications based on this framework.
In particular, an evolutionarily informed “deep rationality” conception of human thinking
can guide psychological research out of clusters of ad hoc models which currently occupy
some ﬁelds. First, the idea of deep rationality helps theoretical frameworks in terms of
orienting themselves with regard to time scale references, which can alter the nature
of rationality assessments. Second, the functional domains of deep rationality can be
hypothesized (non-exhaustively) to include the areas of self-protection, status, afﬁliation,
mate acquisition, mate retention, kin care, and disease avoidance. Thus, although there
is no single normative standard of rationality across all of human cognition, there are
sensible and objective standards by which we can evaluate multiple, fundamental, domain-
speciﬁc motives underlying human cognition and behavior.This review concludes with two
examples to illustrate the implications of this framework. The ﬁrst example, decisions
about having a child, illustrates how competing models can be understood by realizing that
different fundamental motives guiding people’s thinking can sometimes be in conﬂict. The
second example is that of personiﬁcationswithinmodern ﬁnancialmarkets (e.g., in the form
of corporations), which are entities speciﬁcally constructed to have just one fundamental
motive.This single focus is the source of both the strengths and ﬂaws in how such entities
behave.
Keywords: normative models, cognitive modularity, deep rationality, evolutionary psychology, human reasoning,
time scales in rational decision making
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been
searching for evidence which could support this.
Russell (1950)
A foundational principle of science is that good scientiﬁc theo-
ries must generate testable, and therefore falsiﬁable, hypotheses.
Research can then obtain data relevant to that hypothesis and
show that the prediction either holds up or fails. Science thus
has normative standards as an intrinsic property of the scien-
tiﬁc method; the nature of good scientiﬁc theories includes the
ability to provide testable predictions. Those predictions pro-
vide a standard for evaluating a theory, saying what ought to
happen if the theory is correct. In this sense, then, normative
models are an essential property of research on human though
(or research on anything else). Certainly people can become con-
fused between theoretical predictions of what “ought” to happen
(in the sense of as the theory predicts) versus notions of “ought”
based on a cultural or socio-moral position. That, however, is not
a problem with normative standards as a property of scientiﬁc
theories as much as it is a problem of people not understand-
ing how science works. So, for example, when one asks “what
ought human thinking be like?” it is important to clarify if the
question is about a prediction based on a scientiﬁc theory or if
the question carries some presumption of the inquisitor based on
their personal views. One of these is science; the other is personal
opinion.
The problem with normative models in the scientiﬁc study of
human thought is that no single normative standard works for
all types of thinking. How do we decide on appropriate norma-
tive standards? (Which, in this scientiﬁc sense means how do we
decide upon appropriate theoretical frameworks?) Thinking is a
ubiquitous feature of human activity, but the normative standards
for evaluating good food are different from the normative stan-
dards for evaluating a good place to live, which are different from
the normative standards for evaluating a good relationship part-
ner, which are in turn different from the normative standards for
evaluating a good stock market decision. In general terms, for any
problem or task domain there is a set of features that deﬁne that
problem/task and therefore those same features provide criteria
for success (i.e., the “good” solution). The more one knows about
the nature of the features that constitute a problem, the more one
therefore knows about properties that can be exploited to get to
an effective and efﬁcient solution. For instance, some of the deﬁn-
ing features of the problem of food acquisition are identifying
high calorie, digestible items. The criteria for success (“good”
food) are things which contain fats, sugars, carbohydrates, and
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proteins. Other things (dirt, wood, metal, plastic) do not satisfy
these criteria. If one attempts to collapse across multiple problems
or tasks to achieve a general-purpose solution method, the fea-
tures that deﬁne the overall problem become increasingly general
and computationally ineffectual. At moderate levels of generality
we ﬁnd problem solving tools that are simply weak (e.g., Gen-
eral Problem Solver; Newell and Simon, 1972). With further levels
of generality we ﬁnd only normative standard that are uselessly
vague (“Don’t screw up.”) and computational incapacitation as a
result.
Because different normative models provide standards of eval-
uation for different types, or domains, of behaviors, one of the
key questions then is how to parse the various aspects of the
world into domains. In which domains do which particular nor-
mative models apply? Some people will recognize this as the
dilemma posed by the idea (from Plato’s Phaedrus) that scien-
tiﬁc theories should “carve nature at its joints,” but the problem
is that there does not appear to be any single carving pattern
that consistently and uniquely works. Instead there seem to be
multiple carving patterns that can each be legitimately argued
for and that each nonetheless have ﬂaws. In other words, even
within a particular domain there are often multiple normative
models which could be applied, and obeying one standard for
rationality tends to lead to violations within other standards of
rationality.
One method for dealing with the apparent dilemma is to pro-
pose that the mind is made up of a large number of specialized
cognitive mechanisms, often referred to as “modules,” which each
embody their own internal standards of correct solutions within
that particular domain. This is often identiﬁed as an evolution-
ary approach, although the same conclusion can be obtained
via other routes (for example, via functional neuroanatomical
evidence). One can similarly reach this conclusion by consid-
ering the implications of combinatorial explosion when trying
to program problem solving machinery in artiﬁcial intelligence
(i.e., the “frame problem”), which has been identiﬁed in phi-
losophy as the problem of indeterminacy in inference (Quine,
1960; Dennett, 1978, 1984). It is also increasingly a commit-
ment required to make sense of the precocious abilities of infants
when tested using means such as the habituation paradigm (e.g.,
Wynn, 1992; Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994; Wagner and Carey,
2003; McCrink and Wynn, 2004; Xu et al., 2004). The cognitive
development ﬁeld often refers to this situation as the existence
of “constraints” in human infant mental abilities, reﬂecting the
default assumption of a completely domain-general and content
independent cognitive architecture. These constraints, however,
are actually the enablers of speciﬁc cognitive abilities because
the particular skills which they shunt infants into developing
would not be able to emerge without the guidance of those
constraints.
Although various people fret about this proposal being“massive
modularity” (Samuels, 1998) or “modularity gone mad” (Fodor,
1987), it is the conclusion which the evidence impels us to accept.
Besides indications that modularity is inevitable based on logical
principles (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Callebaut and Rasskin-
Gutman, 2005; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005; Carruthers, 2006;
Ermer et al., 2007), computer simulations show that modularity is
a consequence of neural organization under realistic conditions
(Bullinaria, 2006; Clune et al., 2013), and actual physical and
neurological structures point empirically to modular organiza-
tion (Geary and Huffman, 2002; Cheverud et al., 2007). There
is a functional carving of mental abilities, and it is a relatively
ﬁne-grained carving compared to what has generally been consid-
ered before (e.g., Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; Newell and Simon,
1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Johnson-Laird and Byrne,
1991). Furthermore, these lines of evidence do not commit any-
one to impose some of the properties of modularity suggested
by early ideas (Fodor, 1983). Functionally specialized cognitive
modules are not required to be informationally encapulated, or
to accept only highly local inputs, or to be reﬂexive and insen-
sitive to contexts (see Barrett, 2005; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006
for in depth discussions of how and why these properties are not
required elements). Some modules may in fact have these prop-
erties, but that does not mean that all modules must. In other
words, the joints of nature may be carvable, but the lines are
not necessarily “clean.” Consider, by analogy, the various systems
within the rest of the human body: respiration, digestion, circula-
tion, etc. Many of these systems are intertwined, receiving inputs
from each other and sending their outputs to other systems. Yet
we still ﬁnd it useful to separate these systems out for purposes
of understanding and explaining them, and we can see the over-
all pattern of major functional adaptations embodied by these
systems.
DOWE REALLY NEED TO CHANGE?
A skeptical reader might ask, “But, these are theoretical issues
about the grand nature of the entire humanmind (or all thinking);
do I really need to change at the level my actual research? That is,
what is my concern so long as I stick to my particular topic?”
The response is that these issues of the grand nature of human
thinking can and do percolate down to speciﬁc research topics.
Attending to them opens up opportunities, and neglecting them
creates problems.
Consider the area of human reasoning, a topic and ﬁeld that
is central to the idea of “thinking,” and the most commonly used
research tool in that ﬁeld: Wason’s selection task. The selection
task was originally devised by Wason (1966) to evaluate if peo-
ple can engage in logical falsiﬁcation as part of, for example,
scientiﬁc hypothesis evaluation. The task involves presenting a
conditional rule (of the form, If P, then Q, where P and Q can be
any content), usually some contextual information for the rule,
and then four pictures of cards which are described as having
relevant information printed on both sides of them. The visi-
ble sides of the four cards provide information about all four
possible states relevant to the rule: P, not-P, Q, and not-Q. The
task for participants is to indicate which of the cards need to be
turned over for further information in order to evaluate the valid-
ity of the conditional rule. So, for instance, turning over the P
card would reveal information (either Q or not-Q), and this is
information which bears on the truth or falsity of the conditional
rule.
The most traditional normative model for the selection task is
ﬁrst order conditional logic. Given a rule of the form “If P, then
Q” (again, where P and Q are any content whatsoever), there are
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logical conclusions that can be derived from additional pieces of
information: if P is true, then Q is true; if Q is false (not-Q), then
P is false (not-P). The cards which need to turned over for more
information, according to formal logic, are the P and the Not-Q
cards then, in order to assess if there are any violations of the
rule. The general ﬁndings from Wason’s original work and many
subsequent studies is that people are notoriously poor at logical
falsiﬁcation such as this, even though it is computationally quite
simple (e.g., trivially easy for a computer program to do; Newell
et al., 1963).
Curiously, certain versions of the selection task eventually
emerged on which people did quite well, even as they continued
to perform poorly on the original version of the task. One of the
most well known of these tasks which elicit good reasoning per-
formance is the“drinking age problem”(Griggs and Cox, 1982), in
which the conditional rule is If a person is drinking beer, then they
must be over 21” (with the card options thus being: Drinking beer,
Drinking soda, 17 years old, and 22 years old). These content-based
effects on reasoning bedeviled researchers and led some of them
to seek out new theories and criteria by which to evaluate human
reasoning abilities.
Human conditional reasoning does not follow the normative
model of formal logic. But performance on Wason’s selection task
can be analyzed in terms of other normative models also (Elqayam
and Evans, 2011). One can use deontic logic (conditional rules
that regulate permissions and obligations) to evaluate correct ver-
sus incorrect responses. Cheng and Holyoak (1985), Holyoak and
Cheng (1995) proposed that people induce pragmatic reasoning
schemas, which closely parallel deontic logic principles, based on
past experiences. Cosmides (1989), Cosmides and Tooby (1992)
developed an explanation for selection task content effects based
on evolved adaptations for reasoning about social contracts (con-
ditional rules about reciprocal altruism, such as If you take the
beneﬁt, then you must pay the associated cost). One can alterna-
tively use Bayesian reasoning or probability theory (Kirby, 1994;
Oaksford and Chater, 1994, 1996, 2003; Oaksford et al., 1997)
to evaluate correct versus incorrect responses in the selection
task. In these models, correct responses are the selections which
yield the highest expected information gain, whereas incorrect
responses are those which yield little or no expected information
gain. Finally, one can apply relevance theory (Girotto et al., 2001)
to the selection task, proposing that the correct cards to select
are the ones which are judged as most relevant to the current
context.
This very cursory review of theories regarding human con-
ditional reasoning illustrates a fundamental issue in terms of
normative models in the study of human thinking. Most of these
theoretical models of human reasoning aspire to be the one, best
account of how human reasoning works. Researchers pit the mod-
els against each other, attempt to tally which model has the most
support, best support, largest number of adherents, and so on.
Which normative standard is the correct one? Which is correct
at least in the case of human conditional reasoning? Apart from
traditional disciplinary boundaries and preferences (or perhaps
within-research laboratory traditions) there are no a priori jus-
tiﬁcations for these normative models. (And keep in mind that
this illustration is just regarding conditional reasoning; it by no
means exhausts the range of normative models for a realm as
broad as “thinking.”) The situation – the existence of content
effects, the proliferation of normative-based models, the ongoing
lack of consilience – points to there being no general norma-
tive models for all of human thought. One possible reaction
is to largely abandon normativism (Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
Another approach, which is taken here, is to recognize that there
are different domains with different normative standards. Con-
tinuing to search for one normative model to rule all of human
thought, or even all of human reasoning, is untenable and needs
to change.
TIME SCALES AND RATIONALITY
There are several directions from which one can identify problems
with the idea of general normative standards for rationality and
human thought. Another aspect of this problem is illustrated by
the tale of the village idiot:
Once upon a time there was a village idiot who, when offered a choice
between a dime and a nickel, would invariably choose the nickel. Every-
one would laugh at the stupidity of the village idiot, and then go back
to their chores until the next time they felt like a laugh. This went on for
many years, during which the village idiot repeatedly and reliably chose
to take a nickel over a dime. One day, a kind-hearted person tried to
explain the situation to the village idiot. “Look, even though a nickel is
larger than a dime, it is only worth half as much. So you should choose
the dime.” The idiot replied, “I know that. But if I choose the dime,
people would stop offering me the choice between taking a nickel or a
dime, wouldn’t they? Who would be that stupid?”
The implicit normative standard that underlies this story is
a standard economic utility model: people are rationally self-
interested and should prefer a larger quantity of a desired item
over a smaller quantity (Marshall, 1920). What the not-quite-
such-an-idiot village idiot had done, however, was realize that
there is always an implicit time scale when considering the utility
of a sequence of events. A very small time scale, capturing just
one event, can indicate one behavior as having the highest overall
utility (a dime is better than a nickel). A different, longer, time
scale, though (say, capturing at least three choices), can indicate a
completely different behavior as having the highest overall utility.
The tale of the village idiot can be understood as parallel to the
distinction between a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). The prisoner’s
dilemma is an economics game in which two people must decide
whether to cooperate with the other person or defect against the
other person. Mutual cooperation is rewarded, but not as much as
defection when the other person cooperates (the “temptation pay-
off”). However, mutual defection does not pay as well as mutual
cooperation, and cooperationwhen the other person defects yields
a negative payoff (the “sucker’s payoff”). A one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma has this payoff schedule and each person makes just one
choice. In this one-shot version of the game the best strategy for
each player is to defect, rather than cooperate, with the other
player. As with the tale of the village idiot, this is based on the
idea of utility maximization (in this case, maximization of the
payoffs for each player) with a very small time scale of one move.
Each player should go for the largest payoff (defecting), which
also protects them from the worst outcome (being a sucker). If,
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however, the prisoner’s dilemma is played repeatedly between two
players (also called an iterated game), there are strategies which
are superior to constant defection in the longer time window.
The most well known of these strategies is tit-for-tat, in which
a player initially cooperates and then mirrors back whatever the
previous choice was of the other player. Thus, two players can
obtain the more modest (per play) reward of mutual cooperation
rather than becoming stuck in mutual defection. These modest
reward are repeated over the multiple rounds of the game. So, like
the village idiot, each player accumulates multiple smaller payoffs
which sum up to a much larger overall result than a single large
payoff.
The effects of different time scale references also maps onto
the idea of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) as a solution to the
“problem of altruism” in biology. As evolutionary biologists con-
sidered the implications of evolutionary theory for the behavior
of organisms, they realized that there seemed to be an overarch-
ing principle of complete self-interest: an individual should be
focused intently on passing their genes into future generations
and not at all interested – if anything, be antagonistic toward –
other individuals managing to get their competing genes also into
future generations. Yet in many cases animals did things which
appeared to help other individuals, at a cost to themselves, which
seemed to directly contradict the evolutionary theory implica-
tions. Hence, the “problem” of altruism. Along with the idea
of kin-based altruism (Hamilton, 1964), a major explanation of
these anomalous altruistic behaviors is the idea of reciprocal altru-
ism (Trivers, 1971). The key insight for reciprocal altruism is
that a single act of altruism (like cooperating in the prisoner’s
dilemma) can make sense if there is a reciprocal act of altruism
with the roles reversed. So long as the value of the help expe-
rienced by each recipient is greater than their experienced cost
of helping, there is a resulting net gain for both parties (known
in economics as “gains in trade”). Once more, part of the key
insight is to consider multiple, reciprocal behaviors between the
two individuals – an expanded window of time rather than a thin
slice.
DEEP RATIONALITY AND HUMAN THOUGHT
How can they saymy life is not a success? Have I not formore than 60 years
got enough to eat and escaped being eaten?
Smith (1931)
A resolution exists to this situation of arbitrarily conﬂicting
normative models, many of which neglect the role of longer time
scales, and it has been most fully and recently articulated by
Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013), Kenrick and Griskevicius (2013),
Kenrick et al. (2009), Kenrick et al. (2012). This resolution begins
with a concept of “deep rationality,” which presumes that ratio-
nality must be deﬁned with respect to a very long time frame: the
evolutionary selection pressures which shaped the human mind.
There have been a multitude of different selection pressures and
this insight, together with the idea of cognitive modularity, leads
to the idea that there never was (and never will be) a single, proxi-
mate standard for normative rationality. Instead there aremultiple
motives which every person is balancing at any given time. In
other words, to the extent that there is any overarching standard
of rationality that designed our minds, it is not “don’t screw up”
but rather “survive and reproduce.” This ultimate criteria, how-
ever, is not immediately useful beyond its ability to frame more
speciﬁc problem solving domains (also see Buss, 1995; on top-
level versusmid-level evolutionary theories). Rather than a general
“survival and reproduction” criterion, this model presumes that
there are different standards for a successful decision in different
social problem domains such as: self-protection, status, afﬁliation,
mate acquisition, mate retention, kin care, and disease avoidance.
These domains provide fundamental motivational goals for peo-
ple, but because there are several of them we can conceptualize
our minds has having a number of different “subselves,” each
with different motives, different decision making processes, and
even (fromamore domain-general perspective) different cognitive
biases.
Because different adaptive problems require different“rational”
solutions, these solutions can only ever obey a local normative
model which will inevitably break down once the topic under
evaluation moves too far aﬁeld from the particular domain which
constituted the evolutionary selection pressure and adaptive prob-
lem which created it (see also, Sperber, 1994 on the idea of
proper domains for evolved mechanisms versus actual and cul-
tural domains of application). Evolution designed many different
cognitive programs, each embodying particular logics, designed
to function well in particular contexts. In other words, the domain
speciﬁcity of the cognitivemechanisms in the humanmind implies
that not only is there empirically no single normative standard of
rationality which works across all of human cognition, but that
there are good theoretical reasons why we should expect this to be
the case.
This perspective belies many of the traditional criteria for
normative models of rational though, such as obeying transitiv-
ity or the conjunction rule in probability; these are speciﬁcally
applied as abstract, content-independent, and domain-general
criteria. We should, in fact, be completely and utterly unsur-
prised that these types of criteria fail when they are applied to
domains in which they do not correspond to the decision mak-
ing adaptations evolution built within those domains. The fact
that different theoretical models of conditional reasoning, as out-
lined above, each work particularly well within the context of
particular reasoning contents should be alerting us to the fact
that there is no one “human reasoning” normative model. Instead
there are many cognitive mechanisms, each tailored to help us
reason in an adaptive way about many different types of situa-
tions. It is even plausible that some limited abilities are included
in this menagerie that enable general, abstract reasoning abili-
ties when none of the specialized, evolutionarily-relevant contexts
apply.
Or consider the prisoner’s dilemma described earlier. Not only
does using a different time scale change the nature of this dilemma,
but specifying different players in the dilemma can change it as
well. The classic prisoner’s dilemma is played by two strangers
(despite the allegorical “prisoners”being almost certainly friends).
Strangers playing each other in the dilemma helps us to consider
the situation more clearly in terms of domain-general, abstract
rationality. But if, for instance, the prisoner’s dilemma is played
between biologically related individuals (kin), then issues of kin-
ship and kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) come into play. The
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payoffs within a prisoner’s dilemma are fundamentally altered
when the genetic ﬁtness implications of playing with kin are fac-
tored into them: the points that a genetically related opponent
obtains in a prisoner’s dilemma are implicitly beneﬁting one’s own
biological ﬁtness as well (due to the proportion of genes shared
by virtue of common descent). For close kin, in fact, the dilemma
actually resolves itself and there can be a mutually optimal equi-
librium state (Kenrick et al., 2008, 2012). Strangers playing against
each other in a prisoner’s dilemma serves to simplify the situa-
tion, but it also is makes the situation less ecologically realistic;
most of our real world interactions are with family, friends, and
acquaintances.
So should “deep” evolutionary rationality serve as the deﬁni-
tive normative standard of behavior? Not necessarily. It is still
critical to remember that human behavior has a foundation in
cognitive adaptations, built by evolution over previous genera-
tions, and then further developed and ﬁltered through our own
experiences. A set of individual behaviors, within speciﬁc situa-
tions, can violate deep rationality, and violate it as a normative
standard or as a descriptive standard. Being deeply rational is
not the same as being omnipotent or omniscient. We are exe-
cuters of cognitive programs (our evolved, mental adaptations).
This means that there will be certain types of situations in which
the cognitive programs produce “wrong” responses. One type of
such situations is when there is an environmental mismatch: the
responses which were shaped by many prior generations of evolu-
tion are no longer the best responses in our modern environment
(e.g., our strong preferences for fats and sugars even when we
already have enough; our general lack of desire for ﬁber in our
diets even when we are in need of it). Another type of situation in
which individual behaviors, based in deep rationality, can appear
to be in violation of any normative or descriptive model is when
there is a probabilistic outcomewhich is driving the selection pres-
sure for that behavior (e.g., adolescent risk taking can appear to
be irrational because it leads to some injuries and deaths, but at
the same time if those behaviors produced an even larger social
status and reputation beneﬁt for the more successful risk takers
then the overall behavioral tendency can be positively selected for
nonetheless).
EXAMPLES
Having a child is surely the most beautifully irrational act that two people
in love can commit.
Cosby (1987)
A couple of examples may help clarify the implications of tak-
ing a “deep rationality” perspective within a modular mind. The
decision to have a child or not has been characterized as fun-
damentally sound (e.g., Holm, 2005), fundamentally unsound
(e.g., Häyry, 2005), and even fundamentally impossible to evalu-
ate (Paul, 2015 forthcoming). Certainly an economic cost/beneﬁt
analysis in modern environments does not support the position
that having children is a rational choice. (The U.S. Department
of Agriculture estimates that the cost of raising a child to the age
of 17 is $269,520 (for families making over $70,200 per year.) On
the other hand, a biological analysis would point out that repro-
duction is the most fundamental purpose of living organisms, and
therefore any price is worth paying to have children. Somewhere in
between these radical extremes are real people, who very often do
opt to have children yet who also nearly always limit their repro-
ductive rate to something signiﬁcantly less than what they would
theoretically accomplish if they devoted all their resources to hav-
ing children. Brase and Brase (2012) found that both men and
women have strong, emotional reactions (both positive and neg-
ative) to the prospect of having children, suggesting that there are
countervailing forces at work in people’s decisions about having
children.
One compelling way to make sense of all these conﬂicting ideas
and outcomes is to realize that desires to have children is but one of
several different fundamental motives residing in people. We want
to have children. But we also want to be safe (self-protection), we
want to be respected (status), we want to be part of larger social
groups (afﬁliation), we want to have and keep sexual partners
(mate acquisition, mate retention), and we want to be healthy
(disease avoidance).
Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works.
[Gordon Gekko (Pressman and Stone, 1987)]
Now, a counterexample. The ﬁnancial markets are perhaps
the most elevated bastion of true and complete rationality. Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776) rests on the idea of every-
one acting in their rational economic self interests, and many
people consider theWestern ﬁnancial markets to be a huge success
of modern society. A closer look at the underlying foundations
and assumptions of the modern ﬁnancial market, however, can
illustrate how its success arrives by stripping out all but one funda-
mental motive. The ﬁnancial markets are not (or are minimally)
interested in self-protection, status, afﬁliation, mate acquisition
and retention, kinship, or disease avoidance. The ﬁnancialmarkets
are about money. With just one, clear motivating goal, it becomes
possible to be completely rational in relation to the accomplish-
ment of that goal. Critics of how the ﬁnancial markets operate
will often note, in various ways, this issue. Concerns include
problems with the ethics of the ﬁnancial markets, the effects of
modern economic practices on human safety, security, or happi-
ness. But these concerns are tangential to the central goal of the
ﬁnancial markets, so they form only externally imposed borders
on behavior (e.g., through government regulations of disallowed
actions).
If former presidential candidate Mitt Romney is correct that
“corporations are people” (Rucker, 2011), what type of people
are they? They are people who exist largely within the world
of modern ﬁnancial markets, and they therefore live lives that
are single-mindedly about ﬁnancial self-interest. Without all the
other fundamental concerns that regular people have about their
relationships with fellow humans, they quite possibly also qualify
as psychopaths (Achbar et al., 2003). Before thinking that I am
particularly anti-corporation, please note that it is also true that
corporations are, by design and by law, exactly this way because
we as a society have chosen to make them that way. Corporations
cannot do anything other than act purely in their complete eco-
nomic self interest. (Interesting things also, of course, occur due
to the fact that corporations are often managed by regular humans
who do recognize a multitude of other fundamental motives, and
these corporation owners can elect to make decisions based on
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their other motives, sometimes with the approval of shareholders
and sometimes without).
CONCLUSION
This special topic in Frontiers (in which this article appears)
describes the evolutionary approach to studying human thinking
as empirical normativism in which human thinking is considered
correct because it is the thinking which occurs (i.e., that there is
no external evaluative standard). Such a view is described as a
Panglossian framework, in which human thinking is considered a
priori as being rational. This is unfair and incorrect.
First of all, to the extent that anyone actually exists who could be
considered a Panglossian, this framework has never distinguished
the evolutionary approach. This caricature of adaptationism is
trafﬁcked often by its critics and repeated by many who hear
this criticism without realizing that it has been debunked repeat-
edly and by multiple, independent evaluations (e.g., Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992; Borgia, 1994; Queller, 1995; Buss et al., 1998).
Second, adaptationist models are not empirically driven, but
rather based on evolutionary principles. The hypotheses (which
are normative, in the sense of making predictions about what
ought to happen, if the theory is correct) are based on careful
consideration of evolutionary selection pressures, the constraints
faced by a particular species, and existing evidence. Third, the
appropriate issue is therefore not empirical normativism ver-
sus prescriptive normativism (which evaluates human thinking
based on externally imposed criteria such as logic or proba-
bility theory), but rather how one should construct normative
models of human thinking. Is it more useful to work with proxi-
mate models of normative rationality which proliferate under the
traditional prescriptive normativism framework; models which
becomes problematic as they struggle to accommodate ad hoc,
competing domains of application? Or, is it better to work with
higher levelmodels of rationality, based on an evolutionary under-
standing of the central problems the mind has been sculpted to
address?
An evolutionary framework, as outlined here, indicates that
there are some normative standards which are useful for under-
standing the nature of human thinking, but that those standards
are different from many of the normative standards proposed by
prescriptive normativism. The search for a single normativemodel
for all of human thinking is futile, because the multiple selection
pressures which shaped the mind led to multiple cognitive mech-
anisms. A large-scale modularity of thinking processes is required,
and in fact points toward useful ways to escape the multitudes
of single-model theories which often stand in stalemates against
each other. One speciﬁc version of this evolutionary modularity
approach is the model of deep rationality (Kenrick et al., 2009,
2012), which speciﬁes a set of fundamental motivational goals,
each of which entails distinct patterns of reasoning and thinking
(and which may be consistent, inconsistent, or orthogonal to each
other).
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